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ABSTRACT
Partial support was found for the hypothesis that

complexity and flexibility make unique but related
contributions to the connection between belief system

structure and self structure. 95 undergraduate psychology
students at California State University San Bernardino were

given three scales, Need For Cognition (NFC), Dogmatism

(DOG) and the Epistemological Belief Survey (EBS), and
preformed a card sort task developed to assess self

structure, complexity, and stability. The scales were
combined to provide a measure of belief system complexity
and flexibility and then correlated with the card sort

results. Regression analysis revealed NFC, a measure of
cognitive complexity, and the certain knowledge dimension

of the EBS, a factor that indicates belief system
flexibility, made significant unique contributions to the

complexity of self structure, as measured by the card sort

task.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION SUMMARY

Introduction

In 1637 Descartes begins his famous work, Discourse on
Method and Meditation on First Philosophy by doubting
everything. "In the first Meditation, I set forth the
reasons for which we may, generally speaking, doubt about
all things and especially about material things"

(Weissman,

1996, p. 55). Descartes brings into doubt the report of his
senses "All that up to the present time I have accepted as

most true and certain I have learned either from the sense
or through the senses; but it is sometimes proved to me
that these senses are deceptive" (Weissman, 1996, p. 59).

Pursuing his doubts further he cites the profound sense of

reality one feels when they are dreaming; "...there are no
certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish

wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And
my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of

persuading me that I now dream" (Weissman, 1996 p. 60).

This profound, even exaggerated, form of doubting is not

unique to Descartes, or even 17th century Europe. Roughly
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five-hundred years B.C. in China, Chuang Tzu of the Taoist
religion mused; "he dreamed he was a butterfly, now awake

he wondered if he were not a butterfly dreaming he was
Chuang Tzu"

(Smith, 1958 p. 212).

Both Descartes and the Taoist were concerned with
reality and the nature of truth (Smith, 1958; Weissman,
1996) . Plato too, a near contemporary to Chuang Tzu in the
West, put forth his Allegory of the Cave; - an attempt to
reveal the difficulty in knowing the true from the false.

Only through acceptance of profound doubt does one come to
distinguish true reality from the shadow of reality

(Jacobus, 2002). In all these classic illustrations there
is a struggle to grasp reality, an effort to make "truth"
knowable, and a capacity to doubt what one believes. In all
three cases, what is thought or believed to be true is

first brought under doubt and scrutiny.
This readiness to criticize one's beliefs is in

surprisingly short supply in contemporary societies.

Consider the following selection of a transcript from the

O'Reilly Factor talk show. The host Bill O'Reilly, and his
guest, the political commentator Dick Morris, are
discussing the war in Iraq and the role of the media.
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MORRIS: Their vested interest is in trying to assure a
failure in Iraq. They are just like that
congressman.

O'REILLY: Why?
MORRIS: Because they are liberal and they want to win

the election of 08. They want to do that by
minimizing the perception of terror and maximize ,

the perception of failure.

O'REILLY: You are 100 percent sure that the media in
the United States will not report the situation

in Iraq honestly because they want a Democratic
president?

MORRIS: Of course.
O'REILLY: You're 100 percent sure of that.
MORRIS: Yes, I am also sure it might snow this winter.

Of course. It is obvious. That is the way they

are. We have a media that goes into politics with
their own opinion and tries hard to do it.
(Tabacoff, 2007)
The contrast between Descartes' ever-present doubts
about everything and the complete certainty of Morris is

astonishing. Even still, modern man may smile knowingly at
the unsophisticated naivete of Descartes and the other
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ancient thinkers; how more vast is our understanding and
knowledge today. Our modern confidence may fade, however,

as science attempts to explain seemingly ordinary
phenomena. Here is an explanation of time by the renowned
physicist Stephen Hawking (1988).

The increase of disorder or entropy with time is
one example of what is called an arrow of time,

something that distinguishes the past from the future,

giving a direction to time. There are at least three
arrows of time. First, there is the thermodynamic
arrow of time, the direction to time which is disorder

or entropy increases. Then, there is the psychological
arrow of time. This is the direction in which we feel
time passes, the direction in which we remember the

past but not the future. Finally, there is the
cosmological arrow of time. This is the direction of
time in which the universe is expanding rather than

contracting (p. 145).

The above example hints that our modern arrogance may

be misplaced. Time, for most of us, is a straightforward
linear experience, where as according to Hawking, time is

something barely intelligible. To accept the Hawking

description of time requires a mental willingness to let go
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of the more simple view of time as experienced from our

wrist watch.
This thesis is concerned with how the mind organizes
beliefs in its interactions with the world, while also
maintaining stability across the belief system and

continuity in one's sense of identity, both of which can be

at odds with ones sense of reality. The individual's view
of reality is typically adaptive. The need to maintain
stability and preserve identity will often trump accuracy.

Extreme examples of the adaptive nature of obviously
inaccurate beliefs are described by Oliver Sacks in his
touching narratives of case studies compiled in The Man Who
Mistook His Wife for a Hat. Sacks describes an assortment .

of neurological disorders - disorders of losses, of
excesses, of transportations to forgotten pasts, of
nostalgic reminiscence, and of bizarre visual auditory and

olfactory experience. In each case the patient attempts to

compensate for their situation. Many are completely unaware
of their circumstances, and thus unaware of their (or their
nervous systems') means of compensation; they hold beliefs

as fantastic and unreal as Chuang Tzu's butterfly dream,
and as nebulous as Hawking's description of time. Sacks

states:
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But it must be said from the outset that a
disease is never a mere loss or excess - that there is

always a reaction, on the part of the affected

organism or individual, to restore, to replace, to

compensate for and to preserve its identity, however
strange the means may be (1987; p 6).

As the Sacks' citation indicates, beliefs are often

surprisingly immune to revision despite overwhelming
evidence. Absolute certainty in our beliefs can be a rigid

obstacle to understanding. Sacks' case studies show how
identity, perception, and belief formation are all inter

related.

There is always a tension between the need to bring
belief in line with reality - to adjust belief to new

information and understanding - and needs for internal
consistency and stability within and across the belief
system, along with the continued integrity of the self.

Stability, continuity, and consistency provide

psychological and social security. However, a belief system

that overemphasizes stability and rejects new information
and understanding may depart too far from an accurate,
truthful construction of reality, risking the very

stability it endeavors to maintain.
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Summary Preview

This thesis explores three general points in
preparation for the hypotheses. First, the belief system is

constructed of unique but interrelated parts, "belief

claims", and maintained by two features: complexity and
flexibility. The belief claims cluster in a cognitive field
or grid of "depth" and "breadth". Complexity and

flexibility are semi-independent dimensions that operate
within the depth and breadth field, and range from low to
high. The belief claim relationship to complexity is in

regards to size, detail, and context; while the
relationship to flexibility is in regards to movement and
interchangeability. Complexity gives rise to flexibility

which in turn makes greater complexity possible.

Second, the purpose of the belief system is to create
stability and meaning in a person's sense of reality. The

sense of stability and meaning is maintained by two general

paths, one is truth preservation; the other is belief

defensiveness. In both cases it is the belief system
structure that determines which path is adapted; if the
belief claim configurations exhibit high degrees of

complexity and flexibility, then the truth preservation

path is more likely, where as if the belief claim
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configurations exhibit lower degrees of complexity and
flexibility, then the belief defensiveness path is more
likely. In the case of truth preservation, high .

complexity/flexibility allows belief claim configurations

to be restructured in an effort to accommodate and better
integrate both congruent and incongruent experiences and
data. In the case of belief defensiveness, low complexity
and flexibility result in belief claim configurations that

easily integrate belief congruent data, but require a great
deal of cognitive effort to restructure when belief

incongruent data are encountered.

Belief defensiveness divides further into cognitive

maintenance, and ego protection. Cognitive maintenance is
an effort to lower the cognitive load required to
restructure the belief system by refuting belief
incongruent data in an effort to keep the current belief
system intact. Closely related, ego protection results from

a low complexity/flexibility belief system because, in such
a system, the identity is embroiled with the belief claims,

thus ego protection requires that the current belief system
be held intact in an effort to maintain the sense of

stability and meaning that the identity achieves from a

uniform experience of reality.

- 8

The third point is that identity emerges out of the
belief system structure. In the case of high

complexity/flexibility, identity is detached from the
individual belief claims, thus resulting in an identity

that is defused across the belief claim configurations. In
the case of low complexity/flexibility, identity is

attached to the individual belief claims, thus identity is
entangled with the belief claim configurations. The two
manifestations of identity then exert reciprocating force
back on the belief system. A detached identity should be

related to high complexity/flexibility, and result in an

integrated self concept and a maintenance path of truth
preservation, while an attached identity should be related

to low complexity/flexibility resulting in a
compartmentalized self concept and a belief defensiveness

path.
In this thesis, and generally in the relevant
literature as well, identity, self, and ego are all used to

refer to the sense of self that emerges out of the belief
system structure. The structuring of the sense of self is
subject to the same principals as belief system

structuring.
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CHAPTER TWO

BELIEF SYSTEM

The Belief System Structure
Both semantic network and cognitive mapping theories
represent the belief system's structure as a set of

intricately connected propositions (Johnson-Laird,
Herrmann, and Chaffin 1984; Young, 1996). These theories

provide insight into how the mind organizes a profound
complex of concepts and information. Although there is

controversy in the literature regarding the exact nature of
semantic networks, there are common features that are

fairly well established and accepted (Hartley and Branden
1997). Among these features is the notion that semantic

networks represent knowledge through relationships between

symbolic concepts (Young, 1996).

Belief Claims

The fundamental unit of the belief system is the
belief claim. Belief claims are individual propositions or

single manifestations of belief, i.e. "John Doe is a good
man" - "photosynthesis is a biological process preformed by

plants" - "all dogs go to heaven".
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Belief claims, as

individually asserted propositions, are like buildingunits. Individual belief claims can be combined into

complex sub-systems of still larger belief claims. This is
similar to Carey's (2000) notion of concept structuring, in

which concepts connect together to build complex

representations expressing subject-predicate relations,
"e.g. all animals die"

Belief claims collect into

(p 14).

a system that provides structure to the individual's

experiences, finally resulting in a personally meaningful
belief system.

Complexity and Flexibility
There is the need to retain stability within and
across the belief system. There are two important features

that facilitate this process: complexity and flexibility.
Complexity facilitates a dissection or distillation of the

various belief claims within the system; "who is John
Doe?",

"what is good?", "is good universal?"

"does good

have divine origins?" "is good a man made construct?" "what
is a man?" "is a man biology?", "is a man culture?",

"what

is culture?" "what is divine?" etc. The layers of

complexity are infinite. However, if complexity becomes

cumbersome and unwieldy, stability and continuity within
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the belief system may be challenged. Flexibility

facilitates contextual shifts of belief claim

configurations. Flexibility exacts an equalizing effect in
response to increasing complexity. Greater complexity of
the belief claim configurations described above, gives rise

to greater flexibility, which in turn makes further
complexity possible; thus they are synergistically related.
Support for the complexity/flexibility concept can be

found in epistemological belief research. Epistemological
belief theory has a central bearing on the belief system

proposed in this research. There should be meaningful
correlations between the levels of complexity and

flexibility and the features defined in the various stages
of epistemological belief theory. Beginning with Perry's
(1970) work with Harvard and Radcliff students,
epistemological belief research has gained increased

attention.
The basic template of this earlier research has been

recast by many other researchers. For instance, it has been
combined with research in need for cognition, need for

closure, need for structure, dual processing theory, terror

management theory (Landau, Johns, Greenberg, Pyszcynski,
Martens,Goldenberg, and Solomon, 2004; Klaczynski 2000;
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Klaczynski, and Fauth, 1997: Klaczynski, and Robinson,

2000), dogmatism (Klaczynski and Lavallee, 2005) and

identity formation (Berzonsky 2008; Boyes and Chandler,
1992; Krettenauer, 2005). All of these researchers restyled

Perry's original work using alternative terms, and various
divisions or numbering of stages, in an attempt to better

capture the specifics of their research. However, the
various terms and number of stages has resulted in a lack
of uniformity potentially hampering research intentions

within the field (Greene, Azevedo, Torney-Purta, 2008) . In
addition, a bifurcation has emerged; starting with Schommer

(1990), various multidimensional systems of belief have
been developed as well (Hofer 2002).

Perry (1970) identified nine stages (what he termed

positions); however, they can be grouped into four stages;
1) dualism,

2) multiplicity,

3) relativism, and 4)

commitment (West 2004). Other researchers such as King and

Kitchner (2004) have seven stages, while Kuhn's (1991)
model divides into three stages; 1) absolutist, 2)
multiplist, and 3) evaluative, see table one.
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Table 1
Epistemological Stages based on Kuhn/Perry
4 ,
2
3
1
Commitment
Absolute Multiplicit Evaluative
relativism
Dualism
Y

Stage
Name

description

Dualist!
c
structur
e,
us/them
right/
wrong
good/bad
. Belief
unexamin
ed and
taken
for
granted.
All
question
s have
an
absolute
right
answer,
authorit
y can
provide
the
answer.
Complete
certaint
y in
belief.

Authority
gives way
to personal
experience.
Certainty
in
objectivity
gives way
to
Certainty
in
subjectivit
y. All
questions
may not
have an
absolute
right
answer.
There is
still high
certainty
in ones
beliefs,
framed as
personal
opinion

Subjective
objective
balance is
achieved.
Personal
experience
is blended
with expert
view.
Competing
authorities
are seen as
a process
where
understand!
ng is
expanded.
Certainty
is •
tentative,
belief is
actively
reorganized

Restructure
identity and
beliefs.
Recognize
relative
uncertainty
of multiple
possibilities
. Detaches
identity from
individual
beliefs.
Dogmatic
certainty is
replaced with
existential
acceptance.
Commitment to
values and
beliefs
remade in
terms of
personal
growth.

Perry (1970) notes that, in fact, the sequence of
stages could be divided into as few as two positions, with
the pivotal stage being position five.
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This position marks a significant turning point in the

progression. Positions one through four have retained in
some fashion or other the idea of dualism. Position five is
the jumping off point where dualism and relativism are

transposed. The perception that all knowledge is contextual
and relativistic is established. In this stage, the old way

of thinking about knowledge has become cumbersome and
unwieldy; dualism and multiplicity are at odds. To maintain
a dualism at this point (i.e., answers are considered to be

either right or wrong) requires a complicated cognitive
structuring that eventually undermines the dualistic
positions. For the student that perseveres, the weight of

this dilemma gives way to the parsimony and elegance of
relativism.

Perry (1970) refers to the shift to position five as
"both the most violent accommodation of structure in the
entire development, and at the same time the most quiet. It

involves a complete transposition between part and whole;
figure and ground"

(pl23). This revolution of thought is

accompanied by a revolution in identity. In many cases the

need for certainty in the "old self" led the student to
gravitate toward the hard sciences as they seemed a last

refuge against the relativism of the liberal arts
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education. The new relativistic epistemology brings a kind
of liberation in the ability to detach from belief. The

discovery of genuine objectivity provides for a new

competence in comprehending a plurality of context and
conditions (Perry 1970).

In regards to the stage process, the first stage
(dualist/absolutist) is characteristic of a kind of

epistemological innocence. The individual holding this
position sees knowledge as a "right and wrong" "black and
white"

"us and them" phenomenon that is encompassed in

discrete facts (Kuhn 1991; Perry 1970). A simple (low

complexity) certain (low flexibility) belief system would

be manifest at this stage.
Individuals entrenched in dualism/absolutism are often

angry and combative; they need an enemy to fight. There is
often reactive rebellion toward certain (unsanctioned)
authorities (academic, intellectual, political) that are
seen as capricious and arbitrary; there is a retreat to the

dogmatic "black and white" "either or" "us and them"

orthodoxy; there is absolute certainty in the beliefs they
hold, and unquestioned loyalty to the right authorities
(Kuhn 1991; Perry 1970).
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By contrast, for individuals at the last stages
(relativism, commitment/evaluative) there is a
transcendence. There is an active desire to continuously

redefine, transfigure and cultivate ones life, investments,

energies, and identity; in short, the belief system is
regularly restructured. There is an affirmation by the

individual that in a relativistic world, truths,
relationships, purposes, and activities are embroiled in an

ever changing context. There is acceptance of the limits of

human reason. Thus commitment requires courage to take
responsibility for ones identity and beliefs. A stabilizing

maturity is juxtaposed against the realization of the
fluidity of life. There is congruence between actions and
contemplation. A general meaning is achieved, while at the
same time there is comprehension that identity and beliefs

will be forever recast (Kuhn 1991; Perry 1970). Individuals

that are at these later stages should show high complexity
and flexibility.
It is in the middle positions that the important
transitions take place. In the middle positions

(multiplicity) a skepticism or doubt about the ability to

have certainty emerges. These confrontations with ambiguity
begin first in areas or domains of personal taste, then
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proceed to social issues; usually ill-structured problems,

and finally to the interpretation of "hard facts" (Greene
et al 2008; Perry 1970). The position of multiplicity will

resolve the uncertainty in a form of subjective personal

opinion (Kuhn 1991; Perry 1970; Greene et al 2008) .
Individuals holding such positions before the transposition
described by Perry (1970) seem to use this as a fall back
or face-saving method to hold generally to a dualistic

frame. There is a continued attachment between identity and
belief, "objective fact" has been replaced by a "subjective
conviction", but high certainty in one's belief continues.
However, after the transposition, multiplicity is resolved

with an objective/subjective evaluative balance, identity
is detached from belief, and ambiguity and uncertainty are

tolerated as part of the process (Greene et al 2008). The
transposition or ontological shift (Greene at al 2008) is
like a shift in polarity, where until the shift the

individual holds a general dualistic position. After enough
domains have fallen to multiplicity, the polarities
reverse, and the individual holds a general evaluative
position. Complexity and flexibility then are the dynamic
features by which the polarity oscillation and the reversal
take place.
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As has already been mentioned, beginning with Schommer
(1990), the emergence of multidimensional models marks a
departure from the developmental models following the Perry
template (Greene et al 2008; Hofer and Pintrich 1997; Hofer
and Pentrich 2002).These models were conceived as an

alternative to the view that epistemological belief
developed along a unidimensional line. From the

multidimensional perspective it is understood that
"personal epistemology is a belief system that is composed

of several more or less independent dimensions"

(Schommer

1990, p. 498) of belief.
The Schommer (1990) model is unique in that it is one
of the first paper and pencil questionnaire methods of

epistemological belief investigation (Hofer 2002). It has
been reproduced with variations in wording, domain, and

subject criteria (Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson, 1993;
Schommer-Aikins, and Hutter, 2002; Schraw, Bendixien, and
Dunkle, 2002; Wood and Kardash, 2002). Factor analysis

generally shows factor loadings of four to five dimensions.

They are a) structure of knowledge or simple knowledge b)
certainty of knowledge or certain knowledge c) source of
knowledge d) fixed ability in learning e) speed of

learning; however, other investigations have indicated
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consistency problems with the factor loading of these

models (DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, and Hestevold

2008). When comparing several of these models, DeBacker et
al (2008) state that the model showing the best consistency
was generated by the Epistemological Belief Survey (EBS)

(Wood and Kardash 2002).

Several researchers have questioned whether the five
dimensions can truly be categorized as epistemological in
nature (DeBacker et al 2008; Greene et al 2008; Hofer 2002;

Hofer and Pintrich 1997). It has been asserted that speed
and ability are better categorized as having to do with the

nature of learning. The source of knowledge factor is more

difficult to place, but seems related to authority
(DeBacker et al 2008; Greene et al 2008; Hofer and Pintrich

1997). Simple knowledge and certain knowledge are more

often referred to as the nature of knowledge.

The two nature of knowledge, factors have the most
relevance to the current thesis. In the EBS, Wood and
Kardash (2002) refer to simple knowledge as the structure

of knowledge; they state
Low scores on this factor represent a view that
knowledge is composed of discrete, unambiguous pieces

of information, while high scores represent the view
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that knowledge is often complex, interrelated, and

ambiguous, with the implication that sometimes there

is no 'one right answer',

(p.250)

It is asserted in this thesis that the simple

knowledge dimension of the EBS is related to complexity.

Low complexity should be represented by low scores on the
structure of knowledge (simple knowledge) dimension of the
EBS. Regarding knowledge construction and modification,

certain knowledge Wood and Kardash (2002) state

High scores on this factor reflect the idea that
knowledge is constantly evolving, is actively and

personally constructed, and should be subjected to
questioning. By contrast, low scores on this factor

reflect a view that knowledge is certain, passively

received, and accepted at face value,,

(p. 250)

The knowledge construction and modification, certain
knowledge dimension of the EBS should be related to

flexibility. Low scores on this dimension should represent
low flexibility; while high scores should represent high

flexibility.
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Depth and Breadth
Kuhn (1991) states that the notion of "thinking as

argument" can explain how people hold beliefs, form
judgments, reach conclusions, and make decisions based on a

kind of internal, elaborative process involving the
assertion of

claims and then a justification process

involving the casting of doubt on those claims - as in

argumentative dialogues. The current thesis asserts that

this elaborative process follows two paths, one of breadth,
and the other of depth. Depth and breadth could be thought

of as a field or grid that the belief system is predicated

within. Within the depth and breadth field, an inquiry or a
sort of self-applied Socratic Method is employed, where a

person internally poses and responds to questions or

propositions regarding various belief claims. As has
already been stated, Kuhn (1991)refers to this phenomena,
along with other aspects of thinking, as an internal

argument. The depth and breadth probe inquiry is enjoined
to verify and justify the validity and accuracy of the

belief claims, and ultimately the belief system; the

composition of the depth and breadth field will correlate
with the degree of complexity and flexibility in the
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system. With breadth alone, there is an attempt to lower

complexity.

Breadth could be thought of as a horizontal plane. An
individual could follow a linear direction outward and
across in an effort to justify various belief claims. By

contrast, depth increases complexity; depth is more like a
laminating effect. Depth is a re-examination of the belief

claim in context. It is expressed through an increasing

purview of sophistication regarding the scope, scale, and
detail of the leading belief claim, thus elucidating and
magnifying the defining detail of the belief claim in

relation to other claims and the belief system. Depth
necessitates a refinement of the original or leading belief

claim. It is a clarification.

In other words, to elucidate

one of the belief claims in question, it is necessary to
highlight and define the underlying belief claims that

support it.
Kuhn (1991) found that a great deal of her subjects

were unable to proceed past the stage of formulating and
applying a causal theory to the stage of systematically

evaluating the theory in the light of evidence. They rarely
conceptualized evidence independently of their theory and

failed to consider alternative theories, counter arguments
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or rebuttals. This indicates that many people hold beliefs
regarding reality/truth (metaphysical) with poor
justification (epistemology). In support of these findings,
both Davies (1998) looking at dogmatism, and Kemmelmeier
(2010) looking at authoritarianism, found subjects high in

these constructs had difficulty generating genuine
evidence, alternative causes, counter arguments and
rebuttals.

In the relation between evidence and belief in lay
reasoning, a reliance on breadth alone would follow what

Kuhn (1991) refers to as pseudo-evidence and/or non
evidence. In the case of pseudo-evidence, the subject
provides a script, either hypothetical or from personal

experience, that resembles the causal theory they are
asserting. Personal experience it turns out is especially
compelling.

In the case of non-evidence, the subject often

seems mystified that an explanation is required, or simply

restates the phenomena; the implication being that the
existence of the phenomena is sufficient evidence for the

proposed causal theory. An individual with breadth alone is

unable to imagine alternative points of view. This in turn

makes it difficult to imagine that the prevailing view
could be wrong. Kuhn (1991) found that subjects of this
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sort could often provide a great deal of support for their
belief, but it took on a redundancy; there was a
shallowness in simply reiterating earlier assertions in
slightly different terms.

In the case of depth, Kuhn (1991) describes subjects
who begin with genuine evidence as demonstrating greater

sophistication and complexity. Examples of genuine evidence

are, a) correlated change: antecedent and outcome co-occur,

b) counterfactual reasoning: if some external causal factor
is absent, the outcome fails to occur, and c) analogy:
mapping the asserted cause from one domain to another. The

presence of genuine evidence (an element of complexity
resulting from depth in the belief system) made it more

likely that subjects would be able to provide alternative

theories, counterarguments, and rebuttals. In short, the
ability to provide genuine evidence indicated the subject's

ability to falsify their causal theory. Kuhn (1991) states,
that this further implies an ability to imagine that they

could be wrong, which in turn indicates flexibility. The
belief system is multi-dimensionally constructed of belief

claim configurations in a field of depth and breadth. The
property of breadth alone demonstrates an inadequate

justification process resulting from a simple (low
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complexity) rigid (low flexibility) belief system structure
that requires little cognitive effort when integrating

belief congruent data but has difficulty adjusting to
incongruent data. Because of this, it is prone to sacrifice
truth preservation for belief defensiveness. The capacity

to elaborate belief claims in terms of both depth and
breadth requires high complexity and flexibility and a
belief system structure that expends similar amounts of

cognitive resources when adjusting to both belief congruent

and belief incongruent data. Thus the justification process
is more sophisticated. A belief system with both depth and
breadth will also likely prove more efficacious in

generating an accurate view of reality. Thus truth
preservation too is much more likely. This distinction

between breadth and depth, and high/low
complexity/flexibility in the verification/justification
process of belief claim configurations plays an important

role in the belief system function. As was stated at the
beginning of this paper, the purpose of the belief system

is to maintain stability and continuity in ones experience.
These maintenance functions should have parallels to dual

processing theory, need for cognition and dogmatism. Also

there is the role of identity. Identity too plays an
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important and intricate role in belief system function and
the maintenance process.
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CHAPTER THREE

BELIEF SYSTEM MAINTENANCE: TRUTH

PRESERVATION VERSES BELIEF DEFENSIVENESS

Truth Preservation

Kuhn (1991) describes more efficacious causal
theory/belief system structuring as following a systematic

process of genuine evidence production, followed by the
generation of alternative theory counterargument and

rebuttal, all indicating an ability to imagine one's
current position to be wrong flexibility. Stanovich and

West (1997) add that some individuals have an ability to
adjust their beliefs to evidence through a process of

decontexualization; separating reasoning from belief

complexity. To return to the breadth and depth metaphor, a
capacity or proclivity to emphasize depth over breadth
(high complexity) would support truth preservation over

belief defensiveness. Similarly, need for cognition, a
disposition to engage in analytical thinking, a willingness

to tolerate uncertainty,

(Cacioppo and Petty 1982) and

cognitive flexibility should favor truth preservation over

belief defensiveness.
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Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000) discussing
epistemological development describe what they call a

radical shift from an absolutist position, where
objectivism is dominant, to a radical subjectivism and

relativism, where opinion and personal experience dominate,

and finally, to an evaluative position where a coordinated
balance is achieved between objectivity and subjectivity.
Need for cognition research (Cacioppo and Petty 1982;

Yun Dai and Wang, 2007) sheds additional light on the
cognitive undertones of motivation to revise or restructure

beliefs in an effort to preserve truth. Cacioppo and Petty

(1982) state that individuals who score high on the Need
For Cognition scale (NFC) have a tendency to enjoy

effortful thinking, that they have a high need to
"understand and make reasonable"

(P. 117) experiences in

the world, and that thinking is often seen as a "quest for

reality".(P. 117)

For belief revision in the interest of truth
preservation to take place, cognitive effort must be
expended. Additionally, the belief system's structure

regularly needs reorganization, as accurate understanding

of experience is an on-going process. Also required is an
ability to separate individual belief claims from the
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belief system at large and subject the claim to critical
doubt (Schauble, 1996). Consequently, truth preservation is

best served by belief system structures that facilitate

more rational and analytical cognition - forms of thinking
that can override or counter tendencies toward belief

defensiveness. Such dispositions, as suggested by the

research reviewed above, would include the need for

cognition. High scores on the NFC scale should be related
to tolerance of uncertainty, an awareness of the
distinction between theory and evidence, and a personal

epistemology that views knowledge as an evaluative
objective/subjective balance. Ultimately, individuals high
in NFC should favor truth preservation over belief

defensiveness.
It has already been argued that truth preservation
should be a function of both high complexity and

flexibility within the belief system. It has also been

indicated that the two nature of knowledge dimensions of
the EBS - structure of knowledge simple knowledge and
knowledge construction and modification certain knowledge

should be related to complexity/flexibility, respectively.

Further support should be found when including the NFC
scale. It is expected that NFC should be related to both
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the simple and certain knowledge dimensions, indicating

that need for cognition is a result of high complexity and
flexibility. Kardash and Scholes (1996) found when relating
NFC to the Schommer (1990) version of certain knowledge,

that there was a positive and unique contribution of NFC to

the ability to contend with uncertainty. This seems to

indicate an important relationship between these

constructs. The current thesis asserts that NFC should have
a stronger relationship with complexity then flexibility;

this should be reflected in a stronger association between
NFC and simple knowledge then between NFC and certain
knowledge.

Belief Defensiveness
According to dual processing theory, we tend to use
heuristic processing for evidence that is consistent with

our beliefs, and critical analytical processing for

evidence that is contrary to our beliefs. Data that are
consistent with readily accepted prejudices and stereotypes
are processed heuristically because they are theory

consistent. However, when individuals are confronted with

theory-inconsistent evidence,

(e.g. evidence that

contradicts prejudices and stereotypes) analytic processing
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is activated in an attempt to defend the beliefs against
the inconsistencies (Klaczynski and Robinson 2000;

Klaczynski and Narasimham 1998; Klaczynski and Fauth 1997).
As Klaczynski and Robinson (2000) state, "[t]he person
attempts to construct a convincing, logical refutation to
protect the assaulted belief system and, in some cases,
identity and self-esteem."

[p. 401]. Klaczynski and

Narasimiham (1998) describe two potential paths for
defending beliefs - cognitive maintenance and ego

protection.

In both cases the degree of complexity and flexibility
are expected to be low. Intuitively, a belief system with
low complexity/flexibility should be able to easily add

belief congruent information, as it is a simple matter of

assimilation, but should have difficulty with belief
incongruent information, as the complexity and flexibility

required for restructuring may be lacking. Epstein (1994)

indicates that there is a potential for "collapse
(disorganization) of the theory of reality/belief system

following unassimilable emotionally significant
experiences". This means that an over all theory of
reality, i.e., the belief system, even when in error, would

likely be defended when confronted with disorganization or
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collapse. In this case, truth preservation will be

sacrificed for belief defensiveness.
Cognitive Maintenance

People construct meaning through their beliefs in a
variety of ways, for a variety of reasons. One function of
the belief system is to simplify and manage information

(Neuberg and Newsom, 1993). This is essentially a cognitive
maintenance function. Individuals reduce complex and

ambiguous information with heuristics, scripts, schemas and

other cognitive methods (Landau; Johns, Greenberg,
Pyszcynski, Martens, Goldenberg and Solomon, 2004) based in

their belief systems. Klaczynski and Narasimham (1998) and

Klaczynski and Robinson (2000) argue that many lay or
personal theories, interconnected beliefs claims forming an

explanatory system, originate as efforts to explain the

world, reduce cognitive load, and create a sense of well
being. It is asserted in this thesis that a belief system
with high complexity/flexibility will show greater efficacy
in truth preservation, while at the same time maintaining

general stability, as opposed to a low
complexity/flexibility belief system which will be forced

to sacrifice greater truth preservation for stability.
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The role of cognitive maintenance in the above stated
dilemma for the low complexity/flexibility belief system is

well supported by need for closure and need for structure
research. Need for closure is defined as a persons desire

to minimize ambiguity by means of forming definite answers
to situations and questions (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti
and De Grada 2006; Kruglanski, Webster and Klem 1993;

Mannetti, Pierro and Kruglanski 2007) Closure is acquired
through a process of seizing and freezing on information

that provides a conclusion; in other words, high need for
closure individuals will seize upon such information in an
attempt to end the ambiguity of uncertainty, and then hold

tenaciously to their conclusions regardless of later
presentations of additional information (Kruglanski et al

2006; Mannetti et al 2007; Golec and Van Bergh 2007) .
Closely related to the closure construct is research in
need for structure (Neuberg and Newsom, 1993) indicating
that there are two strategies that individuals adapt in an

attempt to manage the vast amount of information that

exists in a person's everyday world. One is avoidance.

People avoid in a variety of ways - they build fences, stay
in doors, and ignore. The other is structuring. Examples of

this are simplifying, generalizing and stereotyping
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(Neuberg and Newsom 1993). In both cases, this is done in

an attempt to lower cognitive demand. Neuberg and Newsom
(1993) claim that the need for structure aids in

understanding the world, but that people who are high in
need for structure tend to be more prone to simplifying

stereotyping and prejudice.

Measures of dogmatism also show that various forms of
cognitive rigidity are commonplace. Dogmatism can be

defined as unchanging unjustified certainty, low

flexibility. High scores on the dogmatism scale (DOG)

predict clinging to untenable attitudes, even in the face

of strong scientific and empirical evidence (Altemeyer
2002; Altemeyer 1996). Altemeyer (2002) showed that
students high in dogmatism refused to acknowledge
inconsistencies in the Bible, even when they were

explicitly shown such inconsistencies. Finally, dogmatism
shows a high correlation with authoritarianism (Altemeyer,

1996).

Cornells and Van Hiel (2006) state people's beliefs

are in part thought to be related to underlying cognitive

motivations that are partially determined by information
processing styles such as need for closure and dogmatism.

Further support for a relationship between dogmatism
and these cognitive mechanisms can be found in research by
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Davies (1998; 2005) . Davies (1998) found that individuals
high in dogmatism were more prone to generate theory

congruent reasons for a belief, and less able to generate
theory incongruent reasons. As has been argued, one
possibility for this is belief formation requires less

cognitive resources than belief revision. This is similar

to the need for closure research cited above (Kruglanski et
al 2006), and to the dual process theory claim that
evidence consistent with belief is processed heuristically,

while evidence inconsistent with belief is processed
analytically (Klaczynski and Robinson 2000; Klaczynski and

Narasimham 1998; Klaczynski and Fauth 1997) The degrees of
complexity and flexibility (high/low) will dictate whether
the system will only be able to add new belief congruent

information, or whether it will be able to adjust with
equal effort i.e. cognitive load, to both belief congruent
and belief incongruent information.
Ego Protection

Cognitive maintenance concerns of stability and
cognitive economy are not the only explanation for a

tendency to maintain poorly supported beliefs. As has
already been expressed by Klaczynski and Robinson (2000),
and Klaczynski and Narasimiham (1998), the role of the
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belief system in the preservation of the self - the ego

protective function - is also important

As noted above, identity is, for low
complexity/flexibility systems, closely tied to the

structure of the belief system. As a consequence, belief

bias can result from a need to enhance self-esteem,

maintain self image, and keep a positive view of the in
group's stature even at the expense of truth preservation.
These are ego protective functions. From the standpoint of
ego protection, belief defensiveness serves the purpose of

maintaining stability within the identity. This is in line

with Klaczynski and Narasimiham's (1998) findings, and is
supported by CEST (Epstein 1994) terror management theory

(Schimel, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Waxmonsky, and

Arndt, 1999; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1999;
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder,

Kirkland and Lyon, 1990) and amebic self theory (Burris and

Rempel 2004).
Klaczynski and Narasimiham (1998) , state that ego

protection elevates self esteem and enhances self image.
The self serving motivations of ego protection are likely
to defend beliefs connected to any in-groups (Solomon,

Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, 2000;
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Klaczynski 2000; Schimel

et al, 1999; Pyszczynski et al, 1999; Greenberg et al,
1990). Kaczynski and Gordon (1996) indicate that personal
investment among adolescents and young adults can result in

bias in the application of cognitive skills. Adolescent and

young adult subjects found "goal-enhancing" evidence more

convincing than "goal-threatening" evidence, even though
the evidence was essentially equivalent. This, along with
the dogmatism citations above are further examples of

ego/identity-centered reasoning (Klaczynski and Robinson,

2000), where personal theory resilience (belief

defensiveness) overrides truth preservation.
Because the DOG scale is an especially robust measure

of exaggerated certainty in ones beliefs, it is expected

that this measure should have a strong negative
relationship to high scores on the nature of knowledge
dimensions of the EBS, specifically certain knowledge.

38

CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF IDENTITY

Identity Emerges from the Belief System

The current thesis advances the notion that identity
or the self emerges out of the belief system structure

described above. Identity is expected to follow a similar

structuring process. That is, the nature of belief claim
configurations that form the belief system, should also

apply to identity or the self. Identity should be subject
to the same dimensions of complexity and flexibility, and

thus should show similar attributes in the justification

process. Finally, once identity has formed it should apply
reciprocating pressure back on the belief system

influencing the direction of further structuring and the

maintenance process.

Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST)

Epstein,

(1994) states that individuals automatically

and implicitly construct a model or theory of reality

(belief system) that is divided into two major parts; a
world theory, and a self theory. The two sub-theories,
world and self, are both individually formed by connecting
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propositions (belief claims) that also bridge the two sub

theories into the over all theory of reality. The theory of
reality is maintained by two cognitive systems; rational

and experiential. The rational system is deliberative and

basically emotionally detached. The experiential system
provides for quick intuitive assessment of situations that

allow people to react without long effortful deliberations

that could prove costly; however, the experiential system
is also susceptible to irrational and superstitious
thinking and is prone to emotional overreaction.

Understanding acquired through the experiential system
proves especially resistant to revision because it is most
active during states of heightened emotional arousal.

Identity and Belief System Maintenance
Support for the notion that peoples' beliefs and

identity are interconnected and play dual roles in an
attempt to achieve and maintain consistency stability and

meaning in their experience is supported by several other
areas of research For instance, Amoebic Self Theory

involves another view of the close connection between the
belief system and self-definition or identity. At the

spatial symbolic level, people have developed the cognitive
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capacity for symbolic and abstract thinking which enables
them to imbue objects, persons, locations, and situations
with personal meaning. For example people have a tendency

to regard things like childhood homes, relationships, and

cultural history as extensions of the self. According to

this view, individuals' identity is bound to these
"identity markers"; there is an implicit and unquestioned

endorsement of how the world is. These assumptions serve to
orient and stabilize the self, reducing subjective

uncertainty (Burris and Rempel 2004).

Terror Management Theory (Greenberg et al 1990) posits

that people conceptualize reality in response to the
knowledge of mortality. Terror management theory suggests
that the identity or self is embedded within one's sense of

reality or world view or belief system. This sense of
reality is constructed in such a way as to protect or
"buffer" the self. Terror management theory and global

cultural world view state that humans create and share
beliefs that provide individuals with the sense that their

existence is meaningful and enduring in an attempt to

buffer the self from anxiety produced from the awareness of
ones mortality (Solomon et al 2000). Mortality saliency is

raised when the subject thinks about their own death.
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Usually this is accomplished by having the subject write a
paragraph describing how they think they will die. Control

subjects are instructed to write a comparable paragraph

describing something unpleasant such as dental pain.
The anxiety buffer is accomplished in two ways; first,

by providing a stable sense of reality, and second, through
the creation of a "social identity" that accepts the

validity of the provided reality, securing the self and
elevating self esteem (Schimel et al, 1999; Pyszczynski et

al, 1999; Greenberg et al 1990).
is raised,

When mortality saliency

threat to self, terror management theory has

demonstrated people's tendency to hold more closely to

their world view beliefs in such distinct areas as
morality,

(Pyszczynski et al 1999), justice (Dalbert,

Lipkus, Hedvig and Goch, 2001), nationality, race, ethnic
and gender identity,

(Schimel et al 1999) and religious

belief (Beck 2006; Jungmen, Nesselroade and Featherman,

1996) .

The above findings suggest a malleable bond between
identity and beliefs. There is also evidence indicating

individual differences in the character of this bond in
terror management theory. Schimel et al,

(1999) found that,

when under mortality salience, individuals with high need
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for closure scores showed greater preferences for negative

out group stereotypes, such as gay males, then individuals

with low need for closure scores. Similarly, individuals

high in need for structure (Landau et al 1999) were found

to dislike individuals who displayed inconsistent

personality traits (sometimes introvert, sometimes
extrovert). Landau et al (1999) also found high need for
structure scores lead to greater "victim blaming" when
under mortality salience. Other terror management theory

research has shown that people high in authoritarianism are
more likely to derogate dissimilar others when under

mortality salience then are individuals low in
authoritarianism (Greenberg et al 1990).

Finally, terror management theory research has found
differences in the mortality salience effect when evaluated

with both dual process theory (Pyszczynski et al 1999) and

CEST (Simon, Greenberg, Harmon-Jones, Solomon, Pyszczynski,
Arndt, Abend,

(1997). It appears that the mortality

salience effect is more pronounced when individuals are in

an experiential/heuristic processing mode as opposed to
rational/analytic, which seems to nullify the mortality
effect.
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The terror management research cited above makes clear
that one's beliefs and one's identity are interwoven, and
that identity plays an important role in maintaining

stability and meaning in ones existence. The relevance to
the present study is twofold. First, it clearly

demonstrates both within and between subject differences of
the bearing■of‘identity on the belief system. When

mortality saliency is high, identity binds to the belief

resulting in a more rigid, low flexibility structure. When
evaluated through CEST and dual process theory,

experiential and heuristic processing modes also show this
attachment of identity to belief. As has already discussed,
when understanding, or belief formation is acquired through

the experiential system it shows considerable resistance to

revision (Epstein 1994). By contrast, the rational and
analytic modes are less susceptible to the mortality

saliency effect, indicating these processing modes have an

effect of decontextualizing identity and belief. Finally,
the individual difference measures, need for closure, need
for structure, and authoritarianism, showed that

individuals high on these traits were more predisposed to a

general embroilment between identity and belief. Taken
together, these points support the idea that identity and
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beliefs play separate but related roles in maintaining the

stability and continuity of the belief system. They also

show that identity emerges from the belief system
structure, and that the extent of complexity and

flexibility will influence the degree of attachment of
identity to the various belief claims, and that the degree

of attachment will affect further levels of complexity and
flexibility.

Identity and Epistemology
Kuhn (1991) points out that individuals who show

difficulty generating evidence that is inconsistent with
their own theories demonstrate a sort of "ownership" of the

theory which contributes to their inability to falsify the

theory, as in conceive of alternative theories and counter
argument. This is in line with the notion that there is

interdependence between lay theories and related belief
claims on the one hand and the self and identity on the

other. Perry (1970) claims that individuals at the first

epistemological position, dualism, are unable to detach
their identity or self-concept from their beliefs. They

have no vantage point to imagine anything outside of their
beliefs. An important feature regarding such individuals is
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the absolute certainty with which they hold their beliefs.

Subjects who score high on the DOG scale tend also to
display high confidence in their judgments, even when
evidence is scant or contradictory (Altemeyer 2002;

Altemeyerl996; Cornells and Van Hiel 2006; Davies 2005;

Davies 1998).
Research combining epistemic belief and identity

status (Boyes and Chandler 1992; Krettenaur 2005) provides
another perspective on the involvement between belief
system structure and identity formation. The identity

status paradigm is marked by a tension between the two
dimensions of exploration and commitment. Exploration
indicates an "active questioning and weighting... of various
identity alternatives", while commitment indicates the

presence of conviction and choice regarding a particular
identity conception (Luyckx, Goossens, Soenens, Beyers,

Vansteenkiste, 2005, p. 605). There are four identity
statuses; Achieved, which is formed after a meaningful

exploration and solid commitment, Foreclosed, which results
from a strong commitment but is lacking exploration,
Moratorium, distinguished by prolonged exploration, but no

meaningful commitment, and Diffused, which is characterized
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as having neither exploration nor commitment (Luyckx, et al

2005)
Boyes and Chandler (1992) showed generally that the

lower epistemic positions, realist/dualist/absolutes, were
associated with the lower identity statuses, foreclosed and
defused, while the higher epistemic positions,

relativism/evaluativism were associated with the identity

statuses of moratorium and achievement. The pertinence of
the Boyes and Chandler (1992) study is the importance of

the advent of "epistemic doubt". They contend that it is
the ability to struggle with uncertainty, arising during
the transition between the cognitive developmental stages

of concrete operational and formal operational thinking

that facilitates the epistemic shifts that in turn result
in the different identity statuses.

Krettenauer (2005) found similar results when he
included identity processing styles. There are three
identity processing styles. Information processing,

considered the most advanced, is defined by actively
seeking, utilizing, and processing self relevant
information. When confronted with discordant and

conflicting feedback, individuals with an information
processing style are willing to test and revise aspects of
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their self-theory. The second style is Normative. These

individuals resist belief and value- threatening identity
questions and information, and instead resolve such

dilemmas by conforming to expectations of significant
authorities. Finally, there is the Diffuse/Avoidant
processing style. With this style there is a reluctance to

deal with identity relevant questions at all. Instead,

there is a focus on temporary states of self-definition,

such as popularity, as in social self. These ad-hoc
adjustments to self-definition as apposed to stable changes

in the identity structure are associated with maladaptive
emotionally focused avoidant coping (Berzonsky 2008;
Krettenauer 2005).

It appears that the more sophisticated information
processing styles, information orientation, and the later

epistemic position, evaluative, both seem to contribute
simi-independently to an achieved identity status, while
the diffuse/avoidant style and absolutist position

predicted identity diffusion and foreclosure.
Interestingly, it was the foreclosed identity status that-

predicted normative processing. This reverse pathway is

thought to indicate that a foreclosed identity influences
processing style, as apposed to cognitive style influencing
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the identity statuses, as was the case with

diffuse/avoidant and information orientation (Krettanauer

2005) . Berzonsky (2008) found similar results when
comparing identity processing styles to CEST. These results

showed that the information processing style had a stronger

relationship to the rational mode then to the experiential
mode. In addition, the normative style correlated

positively with experiential cognition. Finally
diffuse/avoidant was positively correlated with
experiential cognition, and negatively correlated with

rational cognition.
From the above findings, it could be surmised that a

belief system with low complexity/flexibility is likely to

result in a diffused or foreclosed identity status, while
an achieved identity is more likely to result from a high
complexity/flexibility belief system. The above lends
credence to the idea that a belief system that manifests

higher degrees of complexity and flexibility will also

manifest greater complexity and flexibility in the
self/identity; these findings combined with the terror

management citations above, also suggest that the less

sophisticated cognitive styles result in a compounding

between identity and belief.
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Self Structure and Belief System Structure
To this point, it has been argued that identity arises

out of the belief system structure, and that once identity
has formed it exerts reciprocating influence back on the

belief system. As was indicated by CEST, there are two sub
systems, one regarding beliefs about the self, and the
other regarding beliefs about the world the self is

embedded within. Also it has been supported that these two
sub-systems are interwoven. One of the claims of the

current thesis is that the degree of embroilment between
the two sub-systems is predictive of the level of

complexity and flexibility in the belief system at large.
Specifically this is the question of degree of identity

attachment to the various belief claims. As has already
been addressed in the discussion of epistemological

beliefs, a simple, rigid belief system makes little

distinction between the belief and the self (Kuhn 1991;
Perry 1970) Studying self-structures provides an
opportunity to assess this particular claim of this thesis.

Specifically, the degree of entanglement of the self
structure with the belief claim configurations should be a

function, in part, of the relative status of the
individual's belief system in terms of the two dimensions
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of complexity and flexibility. The identity status
literature discussed above supports the idea that greater

sophistication of both cognitive processing and

epistemological belief are related to a more sophisticated
identity that is relatively independent of the belief
system. According to Margolin and Niedenthal (2000 ), the
self-concept is a network of information consisting of
categories, schemas, and prototypes. Linville (1987) adds

that self knowledge is represented in multiple self
aspects. Self-aspects are in turn formed or constructed
from sets of features and propositions; these self-aspect

structures form into associative networks that allow
different self-aspects to be activated under different

conditions and contexts. Markus and Kunda (1986) introduce
a feature they call a "working self-concept".

The working

self is a momentary combination of a few self-aspects that
are activated in unison by experience and social

situations; that is, the working self is a temporary
collection of elements pulled from a universe of self
aspects that make up the over all self' concept (Markus and

Kunda, 1986; Margolin and Niedenthal, 2000).
Linville (1987) maintains that self-concept complexity
is manifest, in part, in terms of the number of self
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aspects; greater numbers of distinct self-aspects result in

greater complexity of the self concept. A self-concept with
greater complexity, as defined above, is thought to cope
with stress better (Margolin and Niedenthal 2000; Linville

1987; Markus and Kunda 1986). Although the specific
reasoning for this varies among the researchers cited, one

consistency seems to be that greater self-complexity

results in greater stability. In the case of both Margolin
and Niedenthal (2000), and Linville (1987), the assertion

is that the larger number of self-aspects, and the greater

diversity between self-aspects serves as a buffer

stabilizing the self-concept by preventing effective
extremity (the degree of affective swing in response to an
event) from spreading, or "spilling-over" to other self

aspects.
A metaphor for the system of diffusion of stress
across multiple self aspects is that of a baffle system in
a tanker transport. One large single compartment does not
deal effectively with sudden or extreme changes, as the

liquid inside will slosh around creating instability.

However, a baffle system creates multiple semi-independent

cells that diffuse the energy of moving liquid.
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When considering the complexity/flexibility

dimensions, it is probable that the large number of self

aspects described above facilitates multiple connection

points between multiple self-aspects across multiple belief
claims. This would be supportive of the complexity

dimension. When considering the working self concept,
Markus and Kunda (1986) indicate this is a dynamic and

malleable property, implying flexibility. When these points
are taken together, the concept of identity/belief

detachment becomes more comprehensive. A self concept with
multiple points of belief attachment is able to let go of

certain belief claims under certain contexts, while others
are preserved or activated, thus maintaining a general

sense of self/identity across the belief system. By

contrast, a self concept with few self-aspects and little
distinction between self-aspects provides less diversity
for a working self to operate within. In this later case,

such a self concept should be more prone to stronger
identity/belief attachment. Like a tanker with a single
cell, there will be a strong desire to resist sharp or

distinct changes in the belief system, as this would

threaten the stability of the self.
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A second metaphor will help further illustrate this

idea; the belief system could be thought of as a rope and
knot system, where the knots serve as the connection points

between identity and belief claims. There are two types of
knot systems possible. In one case there are multiple semi
independent knots forming a knot lattice. In the second

knot system the knots are knotted together in a haphazard
tangle, essentially forming a single knot. When considering
belief system maintenance, it is likely that the different

self structures described above would follow different,
maintenance paths (truth preservation/belief

defensiveness). Under the knot tangle conditions, adding
knots (belief congruent data) can be done easily and

heuristically, as was discussed in the belief system
maintenance section. However, subtraction of knots risks an
untangling of the entire system, thus the disorganization
and collapse of the belief system referred to by Epstein

(1994). In this case there are fewer self-aspects for the
diffusion process described above, and the self identity is
more firmly bound or attached to the belief system at

large. On the other hand, the lattice system, because the
knots can be dealt with independently, results in roughly
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the same cognitive effort to adjust to belief congruent

(add knots) as to belief incongruent (subtract knots) data.

According to McMahan, Showers, Rieder, Abramson and
Hogan (2003), Showers and Kevlyn,

(1999), Showers and

Zeigler-Hill (2007), and Zeigler-Hill and Showers (2007),
self structure is a self organization that focuses on a

distribution of negative and positive self beliefs across
multiple self-aspects.; There are two extremes to the self

structure - one is compartmentalization, the other is

integration (Showers and Zeigler-Hill 2007) . An integrated
self structure has a more or less even distribution of

negative and positive self beliefs in the various self

aspects, while a compartmentalized self structure has

either all negative or all positive self beliefs within a
given self-aspect. Greater complexity in this model would

involve a primarily integrated structure while lower

complexity would involve a compartmentalized structure. It
has been shown in a variety of studies that the integrated

self structure displays greater stability, especially under

stress, while the.compartmentalized self structure appears

to have inflated self-esteem, and high confidence (similar
to high dogmatism and need for closure), but becomes
disorganized when under stress (McMahan et al 1999; Showers
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and Zeigler-Hill 2007;

Zeigler-Hill and Showers 2.007).

Showers Abramson and Hogan (1998) state that an integrative

organization requires more cognitive effort, where as
compartmentalization is a less taxing cognitive strategy.

This is similar to the dual processing notion discussed
above, indicating that an integrative system is organized

analytically, and the compartmentalized system is organized

heuristically.
The nature of the compartmentalized structure leads to
limited accessibility of negative information processing

(Showers 1992), similar to the belief defensiveness
described above. Because of this, a compartmentalized

structure has a greater fluctuation (affective extremity)
with daily events (Zeigler-Hill and Showers 2007) . Unstable

self-concepts lack clarity, and have a tendency to include

inconsistent attributes and may resist change, especially

to negative events (Showers et al 1998), again indicating a

belief defensiveness path. This is essentially the single
knot tangle or tanker compartment that resists adjustment,
and favors defense. This thesis contends that there should
be a relationship between an individual's self structure,

as assessed by the number of self-aspects, the divergence
between self aspects (Linville 1987), and their degree of
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integration (Showers 1992), and the degree of
complexity/flexibility of the belief system at large. A
multi-aspect divergent and integrated self structure should ‘

be associated with a complex and flexible belief system
supporting a detached identity, while a self with few
aspects, low divergence, and a compartmentalized structure

should correspond to low belief system
complexity/flexibility and to identity attachment. The
method for examining the number of self aspects, the degree

of divergence between self aspects, and compartmentalized

verses integrated self structure is a card sorting task
(Linville, 1987: Showers, 1992) where participants are

asked to think of different self-aspects and form

categories from cards with descriptive attributes printed
on them. It is believed that the Showers (1992) and
Linville (1987) card sort task is the best available method
for assessing the degree of identity attachment.

It is

expected that individuals with an integrated self featuring
multiple aspects with high divergence will score high on
measures of complexity and flexibility - namely, the two

nature of knowledge dimensions (simple/certain) of the EBS
and the NFC - and will score low on a measure of

inflexibility or rigidity - the DOG scale. This will be
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considered support for the hypothesis that a belief system
with high complexity/flexibility contains an identity that

is generally detached from the belief claim configurations,
where as a low complexity/flexibility belief system will

contain an identity that is attached to the belief claim

configurations.
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CHAPTER FIVE
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS

Summary Review

At the beginning of this paper it was argued that the
belief system is a network of propositions, or belief
claims, that can be organized in either a complex and

flexible structure, or a simple, low complexity, and rigid
low flexibility, structure. Epstein (1994) provided support

for this same principle resulting in both a world theory

and a self theory. With Kuhn (1991) Perry (1970) and Greene
et al (2008), the belief justification process was

introduced. Poor justification seemed to be a result of
strong personal attachment to the belief claim. The terror
management research also showed that the degree of identity

attachment can indicate the degree of complexity and
flexibility.

It has been argued that belief system structure

results from the cognitive structuring of unit parts,
belief claims,that are propositional in form. The belief
claims connect into configurations that ultimately provide
the individual with a sense of meaning and stability. The
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belief claim configurations are predicated within a field
of depth and breadth, and are maintained by the dual

dimensions of complexity and flexibility. The

sophistication of belief justification is an indication of
the degrees of complexity and flexibility (high/low)

manifest in the system.

The achievement of meaning and stability follows two
general paths: truth preservation and belief defensiveness.
A belief system with high complexity and flexibility will

generally follow the truth preservation path, as adjustment

to both congruent and incongruent data is possible. A

'

belief system with low complexity and flexibility will

follow a belief defensiveness path, as belief incongruent
data is difficult to integrate. Also, belief defensiveness
divides again into cognitive maintenance and ego

protection. Cognitive maintenance is an attempt to refute
belief incongruent data, lower cognitive load, and maintain
the current structure. Ego protection is an attempt to

protect the sense of identity that is attached to the

belief claim configurations.

Finally, it was argued that identity emerges out of
the belief system structuring. Once identity has formed, it

exerts pressure back on the belief system. There is a
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direct relationship between the extent to which an
individual's identity is attached to the belief system and
the degree of complexity/flexibility of the belief system.

An identity that is strongly attached to the belief claim

configurations, as evident in a compartmentalized self
structure, will be associated with a belief system
featuring low complexity and flexibility. By contrast, an

identity that is loosely attached (detached) from the

belief claim configurations, as indicated by an integrated
self structure, will show high complexity and flexibility.
See figure one.
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Figure 1
Belief System Structure

Hypotheses One
The structure of knowledge or simple knowledge scale

of the EBS (from here forward to be referred to as EBScomp)
is thought to represent complexity, while the knowledge
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construction and modification or certain knowledge scale of
the EBS (from here forward to be referred to as EBSflex) is

thought to represent flexibility. NFC is known to be
related to complex cognitive processing, while DOG is a
measure of inflexibility. Thus these four measures will be
used to assess the general complexity and flexibility of
the belief system. The first hypothesis below exclusively

concerns these measures.

The card sorting task measures complexity and

flexibility regarding self structure and the degree of
attachment of the self or identity to the belief system. A

card sort resulting in few self aspects, low divergence
between self aspects (Linville 1987), and a
compartmentalized self structure (Showers 1992), indicates
a simplified inflexible set of self beliefs, and is thought

to indicate strong belief claim attachment. By contrast, a
sort characterized by numerous self aspects, greater

divergence between self aspects (Linville 1987), and a
relatively integrated self structure (Showers 1992)

indicates greater complexity and flexibility, and weak
belief claim attachment. The sorting task is central to the

second hypothesis of the study.
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The DOG scale should have a significant, negative

relationship with the two nature of knowledge dimensions,
EBScomp and EBSflex of the EBS and with the NFC scale. All
correlations among the latter three measures should be

significant and positive. Second, it is expected that the
NFC scale will have a stronger association with simple
knowledge than with certain knowledge or the DOG scale.

Finally, the DOG scale will have a stronger relationship
with certain knowledge than with simple knowledge or the

NFC scale.

These predictions stem from the claim that

EBScomp and the NFC scale are measures of complexity and

EBSflex and the DOG scale are measures of flexibility.

Hypothesis Two
The second and primary hypothesis of the study is a

claim that degree of complexity and flexibility in the

overall belief system will be related to
complexity/flexibility of the self structure and to the
extent to which the individual's identity is separated from
the belief system. Specifically, it is expected that the

NFC and both EBS scales will be positively associated with

larger numbers of self aspects, greater divergence between
self aspects, and greater integration of self-aspects on
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the sort task, while the DOG will be positively associated

with low numbers of self aspects, low divergence between
self aspects, and greater compartmentalization.
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CHAPTER SIX
METHOD

Participants

Participants consisted of 94 college undergraduate

students taking psychology and human development classes at
the San Bernardino campus of the CSU. The sample included 7

males and 47 females (41 participants failed to indicate

their gender). Participants' age ranged from 18 to 52 years
with a mean age of 25 years (SD = 8.0). Family income

ranged from less than 16K to 90K with a median income of
between 50K and 60K. Many participants were first-

generation college students. Only 53% of participants'
mothers, and 49% of participants7 fathers, had attended
college classes. Participants' GPA ranged from 2.0 to 4.0
with a mean of 3.1, and a standard deviation of .41. The

sample was ethnically diverse and included 22% Caucasian,
44% Hispanic, and 17% African American. Most participants

(77%) had never been married. Approximately 70% of the
sample described themselves as following traditional or
established religious beliefs.
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General Procedure
All participants were given three self-report,

questionnaire-type measures and a sorting task. The

measures were presented as a block and the order of

presentation for the measures were randomized within and
across participants. Half of the participants were given
the block of measures followed by the sorting task while
the other half were given the sorting task followed by the

block of measures.

All testing took place in the cognitive

lab in the SB building.

Measures
Participants completed three self-report,

questionnaire-style measures: A modified version of the

Epistemological Belief Survey (EBS)

(Wood and Kardash

2002), the NFC (NFC) scale (Cacioppo and Petty 1982) and
the Dogmatism scale (DOG)

(Altemeyer 2002). For each of

these measures, participants were asked to indicate their
degree of agreement with individual statements using a
seven-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to

"strongly agree".
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Epistemological Beliefs Survey (EBS)
The EBS is a 36-item epistemological belief measure

(Wood and Kardash 2002) adapted from two earlier models -

Schommer's (1990) Epistemological Questionnaire, and Jehng,

Johnson, and Anderson's (1993) Epistemological Scale.
Factor analyses of these earlier epistemological measures
tends to partition epistemological beliefs into four, and

sometimes five, groupings (DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley,

Thoma, and Hestevold, 2000; Jehng et al 1993; Schommer,
1990; Wood and Kardash, 2002). Although there is a great
deal of variation in language definition and factoring, the

five groupings can generally be understood as 1) structure
of knowledge, 2) knowledge construction and modification.

3) source of knowledge, 4) control of learning, and 5)
speed of learning. The current study, used only the two

'nature of knowledge' factors of the EBS (Wood and Kardash,

2002). These are structure of knowledge (EBScomp) and
knowledge construction and modification (EBSflex).
Structure of knowledge EBScomp (10 items; a = .72) is

thought to capture epistemological beliefs that range from
knowledge is constructed from discrete unambiguous facts

and pieces of information (simple), to knowledge is
composed of ambiguous, complex, interrelated
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conceptualizations, often with no single right answer

(complex). It is expected that this dimension should
capture the complexity construct proposed in the hypothesis

of this study.
Items that factor into the knowledge construction and

modification EBSflex (10 items; a = .66) dimension are

thought to capture epistemological beliefs ranging from
knowledge is certain and unchanging, is passively received,

and should be accepted at face value, to knowledge is

tentative, constantly evolving, and should be frequently
questioned and reevaluated. This dimension should reflect
the flexibility construct of the current hypothesis.

Dogmatism Scale (DOG)
The DOG scale is an attempt to develop a more
internally consistent measure of dogmatism as apposed to
the D-scale developed in the 1960's (Altemeyer 2002). The

DOG scale is a 20 item measure (a = .90) that operationally

defines dogmatism as "relatively unchanging unjustifiable
certainty". Although many of the studies using the DOG
scale center on religious topics, the items were developed

to be equally applicable to any belief system (Altemeyer

2002) .
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In the current study it was expected that the DOG
scale will have a high correlation with the knowledge

construction and modification dimension of the EBS, thus
serving as a second measure of the flexibility construct of
the proposed hypothesis.

Need For Cognition Scale (NFC)

The NFC scale is thought to capture qualities that

relate to an individuals' desire to understand, engage in,

and enjoy thinking, and to organize and make relevant the
individual's personal experience (Cacioppo, and Petty,
1982). NFC can further be understood as reflecting

intrinsic cognitive motivation as opposed to static
intellectual ability (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, and
Jarvis, 1996). Cacioppo et al (1996) state that individuals

who score high in NFC have active, open minds, enjoy
engaging in effortful thinking, and display a desire to

organize the acquisition of information in personally
relevant ways.

NFC has negative correlations with dogmatism,

authoritarianism, intolerance for ambiguity, and need for
closure, and positive correlations with introspectiveness,

objectivism, openness to experience, and attribution
complexity, where the latter variable indicates a "tendency
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to generate complex attributions for human behavior"
(Cacioppo et al 1996). The NFC scale used in the present

study was the short 18 item version (ot = .90)

(Cacioppo,

Petty, and Kao, 1984). The NFC was expected to correlate
with the structure of knowledge dimension of the EBS, and

thus serve as a second measure of the complexity construct
of the current hypothesis.
Card Sort Task

In addition to the questionnaire measures,

participants performed a card sorting task (Linville 1987;

McMahon, Showers, Rieder, Abramson and Hogan, 2003; Showers
1992; Showers and Kevlyn, 1999; Showers and Zeigler-Hill,

2007; Zeigler-Hill and Showers, 2007) where they formed

groups of self-attributes by sorting cards with descriptors
or adjectives printed on them, and then recorded them as a

list.
The sorting task is adapted from Linville (1987) and

Showers (1992)

(see also McMahon, Showers, Rieder,

Abramson, and Hogan, 2003; Showers and Kevlyn, 1999;

Showers and Zeigler-Hill, 2007; Zeigler-Hill and Showers,
2007). In this task, the participant was given 40 cards

with a self-descriptive attribute or adjective on each.

Half (20) of the cards have positive attributes, e.g..
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'mature',

'hard working', and half (20) have negative

attributes, e.g.,

'isolated',

'tense'

(Zeigler-Hill and

Showers, 2007).

This task is thought to assess an individual's self

structure. According to this model (Linville 1987; Margolin

and Niedenthal 2000; McMahon et al, 2003; Showers 1992)
individuals organize self-aspects across multiple domain

specific selves which consist of self-beliefs related to
those domains. The Showers (1992) version of the task

employed here identifies- two, mutually exclusive forms of
self-structuring and evaluation representing opposite ends

of a continuum: an integrated self, and a compartmentalized
self. A compartmentalized self would consist of self
groupings that had mostly negative or positive attributes.

An integrative self would have a mix of both negative and

positive attributes across the self groupings. A
participant's sort can be located along this continuum by
the following measure which will be known as the

integration score. First, an overall ratio of negative

traits to positive traits is determined for each group in a
participant's sort. Second, these ratios are averaged

across groups.
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In addition to the integration score, the present
study will assess what Linville describes as self
complexity (SC). Linville (1987) identifies self complexity
first from the number of self groupings a subject creates,
and second from the degree of divergence of the groupings.
For instance, a potential sort that contains few groups,
and utilizes the same attributes repeatedly across these

groups would qualify as low complexity, whereas a sort

resulting in several groups, utilizing different attributes
in each group would qualify as high complexity. This way of

assessing complexity seems to stress differentiation of
self-aspects. To asses the self complexity of participants’

sorts following Linville (1987), a measure of
dimensionality based on the H statistic will be used, where

n is the total number of attributes, and ni is the number
of attributes in a group.
SC = logjfl - (2i tn logiWi)/M,

The greater the number of groups created, the fewer

traits in those groups, and the less redundancy of
attributes between groups, the higher the value of SC will
be. High self-complexity is a function of larger numbers of
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groups, with fewer traits and less redundancy of attributes

between groups.
Two additional measures of self-complexity were

employed in the present study. A repetition score (RS) was

computed, where repeated use of attributes (cards) in
multiple groups is counted. For instance, if a card is used

in two groups it counts as one repetition, where as if it

is used in three groups it counts as three repetitions.
Continuing in this manner, the same trait used in four
groups represents 6 repetitions, etc. The total number of
repetitions is then divided by the number (40) of possible
traits. The last sorting task measure of self complexity is
the total number of groups (TNG) in a participant's sorts.

TNG indicates the number of self-aspects comprising the
self concept; the more self aspects the greater the

complexity of the self structure.

Showers describes another sorting task measure of

possible relevance to this study. This is a phi (cp)

coefficient,

which is based on the chi-square statistic computed
from the individual sorts of each subject. Each sort is
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arranged in a contingency table, where the columns

represent the individual groupings formed by a participant,
and the rows provide the number of negative attributes (row

1) and the number of positive attributes (row 2) in each of
the individual groupings. The phi indexes the extent to

which the proportion of negative to positive traits is
varying from one group (self-aspect) to another in the

participant's sort. Phi ranges from 0 to 1, where 0

purportedly equals homogeneity, stability, or a lack of
variability across groups. This measure will be known as

variability of structure (VS) because it indicates the
extent to which the self aspects share the same internal
structure in terms of the valence of the traits within the

group.
Originally Linville (1987) and Showers (1992) used 33
cards. This was later expanded to 40 cards (Showers,
Abramson and Hogan, 1998; Showers and Kevlyn, 1999), 20
with positive attributes, and 20 with negative attributes

to assess compartmentalization. The current study intends
to use 40 cards.
The administration of the card sort task was as
follows. Subjects were given 40 cards with descriptive

adjectives, half (20) negative (e.g., tense), and half (20)
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positive (e.g., confident) printed on them. The cards all

had a corresponding number on each. Also they were given
two legal sized papers with 14 columns on them.

Participants were told to think about different

aspects of themselves and their life as they arrange the
cards into groups, and then record the corresponding
numbers into the columns on the paper. They were told they
can make one, two, or three groups at a time, as they think

of them, and then mix the cards and resort into further
groupings. They could make as many or as few groups as they

wanted, and they could re-use or not use any of the cards.
Participants were given 25 minutes to perform the card
sort, and an additional 5 minutes to finish if they needed.

Subjects were told to use all the time they needed as this
is a free association task. Only six participants could

perform the card sort task at a time, as there is a
tendency for participants who finish early to 'suggest' to
those taking longer that they should stop.

The claim of the present study was that identity or
self-concept is reciprocally and mutually related to the

levels of flexibility and complexity in a person's belief
system. Specifically, a detached identity, featuring high

le-Xs of integration across multiple and divergent self
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concept groupings should show higher levels of flexibility
and complexity, while a relatively attached identity,

featuring substantial compartmentalization across few and

homogeneous self concept groupings should show lower levels

of flexibility and complexity. Consequently it is expected
that higher complexity/flexibility as assessed by the EBS,

NFC, and DOG measures will be positively related to greater

integration, a greater number of self-aspects,, and greater
divergence of self aspects on the sorting task.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

RESULTS

Reliability of Scales
Preparatory to testing the hypotheses of this study,

reliabilities were computed for each of the four scales in
the study using the present sample. Results indicated that
the two EBS scales (Wood and Kardash, 2002) had

reliabilities that were below those reported in the
literature. Dropping specific items from these scales,
however, improved their reliability. One item was dropped

from the EBScomp scale yielding an alpha of .67 and three

items were dropped from the EBSflex scale resulting in an
alpha of .60. Wood and Kardash. (2002) report alphas of .72
and .66, respectively, for these two scales.

Correlations of Complexity
and Flexibility
The first hypothesis of this study involved the claim

that the four scales employed as measures of complexity and
flexibility should be interrelated. This should involve
significant negative correlations between dogmatism and

each of the other three scales and significant positive
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correlations for all remaining pairings. In addition, the

two alleged measures of complexity - NFC and EBScomp should be more highly interrelated than either is to the
two alleged measures of flexibility. In addition, the two

alleged measures of flexibility - dogmatism and EBSflex should be more highly interrelated than either is to the
alleged measures of complexity.

To assess the first hypothesis, a series of
correlations was run (See table 2).

Table 2
Correlations of scales to measure complexity and
flexibility
NFC
DOG
EBScomp

NFC

1.

.025

1.

DOG
EBScomp

EBSflex

EBSflex

. 272
**

.010

-.119

-.175

1.

-.057

1.

Note: * P < .05 ** P < .01, 94 participants. NFC = need for
cognition, DOG = dogmatism, EBS comp = EBScomp, EBS flex =
EBSflex.

Results indicated that hypothesis 1 is only partially
J

supported. It was expected that the four scales would

correlate with one another, with the stronger relationships
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being between the two complexity measures, as well as

between the two- flexibility measures. However all

correlations were non-significant with the exception of the

correlation between NFC and EBScomp. It should also be
noted that the expected negative correlation between

dogmatism and EBSflex did obtain prior to modification of
the EBS scales to improve reliability, r (92) = -.23, p <

.025.
Tests of the difference between correlations were
conducted to determine whether or not the additional claim

of hypothesis 1 regarding which correlations would be the
strongest was consistent with the findings. Results
indicated that the correlation between NFC and EBScomp was

higher than either the correlation between EBScomp

and

dogmatism, z (94) = 2.96, p <.007, or between EBScomp and

EBSflex, z (94) = 2.27, p < .023. This is consistent with
expectations. The correlation between the two complexity
measures did not differ significantly from the correlation

between NFC and either dogmatism, z (94) = 1.71, p < .087,
or EBScomp, z (94) = 1.81, p < .07, though trends were
present that approached significance. By contrast, the

correlation between the two flexibility measures dogmatism and EBSflex - was not greater than the
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correlations between either of these measures and each of
the complexity measures.

Card Sort Analyses
The card sorting task was employed to test the second

and primary hypothesis which held that complexity and
flexibility in the belief system would be related to self

structure. The card sorting task was expected to capture
several features regarding self structure. Specifically,
these were number of self aspects within the self concept,

divergence of self aspects across the self concept,
integration/compartmentalization, and variation between

self aspects.

The number of groups (TNG) within a sort is regarded

as a measure of the number of self aspects that make up the
self concept and should be related to complexity of the

belief system., The self-complexity (SC) and repetition

scores (RS) are measures of diversity or differentiation

across self-aspects. Ratios of negative and positive traits
within and across groups should indicate
integration/compartmentalization (IS), and finally the phi
score seems best to indicate variation between and across

groups (VS).
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To determine the degree of similarity among the
various measures of performance on the card sort task, a

series of correlations was conducted among the above
indices of self-structure. See Table 3 for the results.

Table 3
Correlations scores for card sort task
TGN
SC
RS

TNG
SC
RS

1.

IS

VS

**
.647

.193

.115

-. 775
**

*
-.227

-.015

**
.284

*
-.240

**
-.501
1.

1.

1.

IS

**
-.326

1.

VS

Note: * p < .05 ** p< .01, 94 participants. TNG = total
number of groups SC = self complexity score, RS =
repetition score, IS = integration score, VS =
negative/positive variation score.

From Table 3 it can be seen that patterns of

intercorrelations are present that are not consistent with
assumptions in the literature about what these variables
are measuring. The TNG, SC, and RS are purportedly

measuring complexity of the self.

According to the

literature, TNG as a measure of the number of self aspects
should be positively related to SC and each of these

variables should be negatively related to RS. This was not
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the case. Also, the measure of integration - IS - should be

positively related to TNG and SC and negatively related to
RS. This pattern also was generally not found.
These results make it unclear what aspects of self
structure the variables in the study are measuring.
However, one possible interpretation for these findings is

that the 40 card limit of the sort task is a problem
because it means that the use of more traits in a sort is

going to drive RS upwards and SC downwards. At the same

time, the use of larger numbers of traits could be
construed as indicating greater complexity. The number of

traits is, for example, closely associated with the number
of groups - a measure of self-complexity.

On this basis,,

it may be more accurate to consider low scores on SC and

high scores on RS as indicating complexity.

In addition,

RS may actually be measuring integration in -that some
degree of repetition across groups may be an important
integrative factor.

One final result to point out from Table 2 is that the
two variables (IS, VS) related to integration (Showers,

1992; McMahon, Showers, Rieder, Abramson, and Hogan, 2003;

Showers and Kevlyn, 1999; Showers and Zeigler-Hill, 2007;
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Zeigler-Hill and Showers, 2007) were negatively correlated

with each as would be expected.

Complexity and Flexibility and Card Sort Analysis

A second set of correlations was conducted between the
four measures of complexity/flexibility of the belief

system and the indices of self structure from the sorting

task. The results are presented in table 4. As can be seen,

only NFC and EBSflex had any significant correlations with
self structure. Both measures had negative correlations

with SC score and positive correlations with RS. In

addition, NFC had a positive correlation with number of
groups.

Again, if RS and SC are reversed by the argument

made above, the directions of these relationships make

sense given the theoretical framework of the study.
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Table 4
Correlations of scales with card sort scores
NFC
EBS
DOG
comp

TNG

*
.211

EBS
flex

.179

.114

.152

SC

**
-.311

-.053

.111

- . 274
**

RS

**
.280

.183

.139

*
.248

IS

-.063

.039

.007

-.112

VS

.001

-.016

.043

.051

Note: * P < .05 ** P< .01, 94 participants. NFC = need for
cognition, EBS comp = EBScomp, DOG = dogmatism, EBS flex =
EBSflex, TNG = total number of groups, SC = self complexity
score, RS = repetition score, IS = integration score, VS =
negative/positive variation score.

A regression analysis was conducted to determine

whether the significant complexity measure (NFC) and the
significant flexibility measure (EBSflex) each make non-

redundant, independent, contributions to explaining
variance of the two primary sorting task measures. Two

regression analyses were conducted - one predicting SC
(self-complexity) score and the other predicting RS

(repetition score).

No demographic variables were related

to the two criterion variables. For this reason,
demographic variables were not entered as controls in the

analysis.
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Results from the regression to predict SC indicate

that NFC, p = -.31, P < .002, and EBSflex, p = -.27, P <
.005, each made significant, independent contributions to
the prediction of SC, R2 =.17, F (2.92) = 9.45, p < .001.

Likewise, results from the regression to predict RS
indicated that NFC, p =.28 p <.005, and EBSflex, p = .25, p

< .013, each made significant, independent contributions to
predicting RS, R2 = .14, F(2, 92) = 7.48, p < 001. These
regressions indicate that need for cognition and EBS

flexibility are capturing different aspects of the card
sort variables SC and RS. Those qualities appear to be

complexity and flexibility.

Supplementary Analysis

There were some interesting and potentially
instructive correlations among the variables of the study

which did not pertain to either of the hypotheses being
assessed. These are reported, here and will be discussed

below. First, the EBS scales were related to parent
education and participant age. Specifically, EBScomp was

positively related to both mother's education, r (94) =

.21, p <.045, and father's education, r (94) = .22, p<.034.
This is sensible, and in accord with the general theme of
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the thesis. More educated parents would likely provide
environments that result in greater complexity and

flexibility in a person's belief system.
EBSflex was positively related to participant age, r

(94) = .28, p<.006. This again is sensible, as it is

expected that an individual should develop grater
flexibility as they mature. However, it also could be that

at some point the flexibility dimension reverses as people
become, set in their ways. The mean age of the present study

was 25, which is relatively young.
Interestingly, the IS was negatively related to both
year in college, r (94) = - .25, p<.016, and age r (94) = -

.25, p <.017. This result is counter intuitive. Age and

education should lead to better integration. This could be
a problem of participant population; it is possible that
the collage experience creates particular stressors that

result in compartmentalization.

Finally, religious importance was negatively related
to the TNG (total number of groups) or self aspects, r (94)
- - .21, p < .04, and positively related to DOG, r (94) =
.41 p < .00. Again this is sensible as dogmatism and

religion have been noted to correlate by other researchers

(Crowson, DeBacker, and Davis, 2007) . Dogmatism is also
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characterized as holding simplistic views (Altemeyer, 2002)
which should lead to fewer self aspects.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
DISCUSSION

The first hypothesis of this study was that the four
scales measuring complexity and flexibility of the belief
system should correlate with each other; the stronger

relationships should be between NFC and EBScomp - the two

proposed measures of complexity - and between DOG and
EBSflex - the two proposed measures of flexibility. The

results indicated that only NFC and EBScomp were
significantly related, although DOG and EBSflex did
correlate significantly before the two EBS scales were

modified in order to improve their reliability. The
relationship between the two complexity measures was
generally stronger than relations between either of these

and each of the other scales. These results are only

partially supportive of the first hypothesis.

There is

support here for a claim that the complexity measures share

some common variance. However, it is clear that these four
scales are substantially independent. This indicates these
scales are likely measuring varied aspects of complexity
and flexibility.
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The second, and primary, hypothesis of the study
involved a claim that degrees of complexity and flexibility

in the overall belief system will be related to
complexity/flexibility of the self structure and to the

extent to which the individual's identity is separated from
the belief system. Specifically, it was expected that the

NFC and both EBS scales would be positively associated with

larger numbers of self aspects, fewer repetitions, and
greater integration of self-aspects on the sort task, while
the DOG would be positively associated with low numbers of

self aspects, higher repetition, and greater
compartmentalization.

Self structure was measured through five variables.
The three variables based on Linville's (1987) work were
the number of self aspects, TNG, the number of repetitions

of traits across self aspects or groups, RS, and self

complexity, SC, assessed through a log statistic that was
sensitive to the total number of groups, number of traits
per group, and the potential for repetition, based on the

40 card/trait limit. Two variables were based in the work
of Showers (1992) and colleagues. Integration with respect

to self structure or self concept was measured as the

extent to which negative and positive traits were combined
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within individual self aspects or groupings, IS,
representing realistic and stable self representation. A

second variable from Showers pertaining to the sort task
was the variability of structure score, VS This variable is

based on the phi statistic and was originally expected to
capture integration/compartmentalization (Showers 1992).

However, as discussed in the Method section, this variable

is actually assessing negative/positive ratio variation

across groups within a particular sort. Higher variation
achieved higher scores. Although it is possible to have an
integrated sort that also had a high VS, it was much more

likely that compartmentalized sorts would result, as

integration tended to produce homogeneity.
Inter-correlations among these five measures generated
a pattern that differs from expectations found in the

literature. It was argued above that RS and SC should be
reversed when interpreted as measures of complexity. Doing

so yields sensible relationships among the card sort
variables.

Results of the present study with regard to the second
hypothesis indicate limited support. Two of the four scales
correlated with aspects of self structure as assessed by
the card sort task. These were NFC and EBSflex - a presumed
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measure of complexity of the belief system and a presumed
measure of flexibility, respectively. Regression analyses

also indicated that NFC and EBSflex made independent

contributions to predicting self structure.

Why wasn't there more support for hypothesis two? One
explanation could be limitations regarding the card sort
task. First, the instructions to the participant were

vague. The original intention of this ambiguity was to
avoid cueing or prompting participants. According to the
literature, the goal was for the participant to select the

structure of their groups solely through the process of
sorting through the deck in a free associative manner.

Another problem was that the 40 card limit produces a

condition where the creation of many groups with

significant numbers of cards/traits per group naturally
leads to repetition of trait/card use across groups. While
repetition is treated in the literature as an indication of

low self complexity, a greater number of groups is treated
as indicating high complexity. These variables are

contradictory. In addition, the SC based on the natural log
of 40 only assesses redundancy as the use of more than 40
cards; it does not account for actual repetition of cards
used in multiple groups. In fact, the SC seemed to measure
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self complexity in reverse; low-numbers of groups and low

numbers of traits within groups yielded the higher scores,

while according to the literature this result should be an
indication of low self complexity. By contrast, high
numbers of groups and high trait numbers within groups

yielded relatively lower SC scores, while these outcomes
are interpreted as indicating high complexity in the

literature.
The above discussion indicates methodological problems
with the sort task and its scoring. The issue of group

divergence is potentially a theoretical problem as well.

According to the literature, the greater the distinction
between groups the greater the self complexity;
operationally defined as a lack of trait/card repetition.

An alternative view could be that some core characteristics
of the self concept should be generalized to the various
self aspects. From this position there would be an optimal

amount of redundancy, where too much redundancy would
result in homogeneity of the self aspects indicating low
self complexity, while extreme heterogeneity of the self

aspects could lead to instability of the self concept. This
suggestion of a possible non-linear effect is partially
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supported by correlations among the variables IS, VS, RS,

and SC.
As has been discussed, a high IS, indicating

integration of negative and positive traits within the
participant's groups, is also indicating a kind of balance.
The higher the IS score, the more of a balance there is

within groups between negative and positive traits.

According to the literature, this balance helps maintain
stability of the self structure. By contrast, the VS is a

measure of homogeneity across groups. A high VS score means

significant heterogeneity or variability of internal
structure across groups and this should be tantamount to

lower stability. So IS and VS should be inversely related.
This claim is supported by the negative correlation between

IS and VS

SC and RS also capture homogeneity in a sense but do
so directly from trait repetition, a characteristic that is
not involved in computing the integration score. The
correlations between IS, RS, and SC suggest a nexus of

group homogeneity. The IS branch manifesting through

integration; the RS and SC branch manifesting through trait

repletion. This notion is further supported by the negative
correlation between VS and RS.

94

The findings of the current research show important

parallels with the findings of Kardash and Scholes (1996).
Their research found no direct relationship between NFC and
Schommer's (1990) epistemological questionnaire, but did
find that both NFC and the certain knowledge factor (in our
case EBSflex) made significant unique contributions to an

individuals ability to suspend absolute conclusions about
ambiguously presented material regarding whether HIV causes

AIDS. This seems to indicate that both complexity and

flexibility of the belief system helped facilitate the
holding of multiple competing claims simultaneously, a sign

of complexity, while resisting absolute conclusions in an
effort to remain open to alternative possibilities, a sign

of flexibility. The present study similarly found that

complexity and flexibility measures made unique
contributions to predicting more adaptive self structures.
I

The findings of the current research are in partial
conflict with previous research regarding self structure.
Both Linville (1985; 1987) and Margolin and Niedenthal

(2000) state that self complexity stems from multiple self

aspects and the degree of divergence between self aspects.
The current findings are in agreement with the first
assertion; TNG had a significant positive correlation with
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NFC indicating more self aspects are related to greater
complexity. The conflict is with self aspect divergence. As

was addressed earlier in the discussion, high divergence of
self aspects (as measured by SC and RS) was not associated

with larger numbers of self aspects, TNG. One alternative
explanation for this is that some lack of divergence or
differentiation of self aspects produces a stabilizing

influence on the self concept. Previous research has shown
that integrated self aspects demonstrate a more realistic

self view, greater complexity and more stability (McMahan
et al 1999; Showers and Zeigler-Hill 2007; Zeigler-Hill and

Showers 2007). Markus and Kunda (1986) attempting to
resolve the contradictory problem of stability and

malleability of the self structure introduce the notion of
a working self, where the "working self concept consists,

then, of one's core self conceptions that are tied to the

immediate social circumstances" (p859). It could be that an

optimal number of repeated, core traits would allow the
working self to stay tethered to the core structure of the

self concept.
Enough support for the hypotheses of the current study
was obtained to indicate further directions for future

research. First, the flexibility measures DOG and’EBSflex
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did not reach a significant correlation. These scales could
be checked again using a more diverse population pool, and
cross checked with other similar scales, such as need for
closure and need for structure. It could be that the

flexibility dynamic of the belief system is more elusive.
Comparing and contrasting the current methods for

evaluating this construct could prove instructive.
The card sort task appears to have problems both
conceptually and methodologically. The conceptual problem

of self aspect divergence and the roles of heterogeneity
verses homogeneity a complex or flexible self structure

have been discussed at length above. A more refined and
thorough method for addressing this problem seems

warranted. First the 40 card limit is an obvious pit fall,
as larger numbers of groups will inevitably lead to card
reuse. An increase in the number of cards could help

mitigate that problem. Also there is the nature of the
groups themselves. The IS and VS of the current study

partly assessed the structure of the groups and their
relationship to each other, but a deeper assessment of the
individual groups and their contextual fit within the set

also seems warranted. A modification that could address

this could be some form of interview with the participant
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that elicits elaborations regarding the nature of their
sort groups. This could at the same time address the

problem of ambiguity regarding instructions addressed
above. Because an interview method would be conducted one

participant at a time, two other issues could be addressed

as well. One is the social effect, the need to stop at the
same time other participants do. The other is the incentive
to do a thorough and complete sort in anticipation of the

discussion with the experimenter. Finally it is difficult

to know just to what extent, if at all, the card sort task

is genuinely capturing self structure. It could be
instructive to compare card sort finding directly with
other methods of evaluating self structure and identity.

Conclusion

Generally speaking, this study was concerned with how
individuals structure their beliefs. Through out history,
and in contemporary society there has been great divergence

in what people believe and why. One may wonder how it could

ever be thought that the earth was flat. But equally so it
is easy to imagine how one could have such faith that the
earth was round when all convention indicated it was not.
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It was not child like faith, but an understanding of

geometric formulas that lead 15th century thinks to surmise
the earth was round; it was personal and anecdotal

experience, and an inability to imagine that one could be
wrong that held people in the belief that the earth was

flat.
The human condition is peppered similar examples;
conventional beliefs are held with little or no question,

in the worst cases mans identity is tenaciously tied to
those beliefs, while progress often results from a detached

identity, the flexibility to imagine accepted beliefs could

be wrong, and the complexity to imagine alternatives.
"We shall never be certain that our dearest truth may
not be the most useful form of error" Nietzsche.

1929, p. 30) .
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(Durant,
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APPENDIX A

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

You have been given three questionnaires and a general
information form. First fill out the information form, and
then each of the questionnaires in order; Each is a
different method of assessing how people form beliefs and ,
think about themselves and issues that are important to
their life. Consider each statement and use the scale below
to indicate the extent to which you AGREE OR DISAGREE with
the statement There are no right or wrong answers; simply
give the response you think most closely represents how you
feel.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
2
1

Mildly
Neutral
Disagree
4
3
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Mildly Agree
Agree
5
6

Strongly
Agree
7

APPENDIX B
GENERAL INFORMATION
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Appendix B

GENERAL INFORMATION
Participant #

1.

_______

GENERAL INFORMATION
What is your age? ____

2.

What is your current marital status?
(check one)
___ married ___ never married ___ divorced or separated
___widowed

3.

What is your year in college?
(check one)
____ Freshman ____ Sophomore
____ Junior .____ Senior

4.

What is your major in college?

5.

What was your total family income last year (from all
sources, before taxes)? This refers tothe summed
incomes of all individuals living in your home:
$50,000 to $59, 999
less than :15,999
$60.000 to $69, 999
$15,999 to $19,999
$70,000 to $79, 999
$20,000 to $29,999
$80,000 to $89, 999
$30,000 to $39,999
$90,000 or more
$40,000 to $49,999

6.

Please tell us who lives in your house and fill in the
appropriate numbers:
a) Total number of children (ages 0 to 18) _____
Ages:_________________________
b) Number of other adults (over 18) besides yourself

7.

What
___
___
___
___
,__
___
___

race do you consider yourself to be? (check one)
Caucasian/Anglo-American/White
Native American
African/African-American/Black
Pacific Islander
Hispanic/Latino/Latina
Asian
Middle Eastern (Arabic)

104

___ Other (specify)

_________________

8.

What is the highest level of education that your
MOTHER completed?
___ Grade 5 or below.
___ Between grade 5 and 8.
___ Some high school but didn't finish.
___ Completed high school degree.
___ Some college.
___ Completed college degree.
___ Graduate degree.

9.

What is the highest level of education that your
FATHER completed?
___ Grade 5 or below.
___ Between grade 5 and 8.
___ Some high school but didn't finish.
___ Completed high school degree.
___ Some college.
___ Completed college degree.
___ Graduate degree.

10.

What is your employment status? (check one)
___working part time
___working full time
___ unemployed

11.

Please indicate your best estimate of your current,
cumulative GPA covering the sum of your college
courses to date: ____________

12. Please indicate the religious/spiritual belief that
best defines you

___ I do not have any religious/spiritual belief
___ I am agnostic regarding religious/spiritual belief
___ I prefer not to define my religious/spiritual
belief
___I follow established traditional
religious/spiritual belief
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13. Please indicate the importance of religious/spiritual
belief

___ Not important at all
___ Somewhat important
___Very important

14. Please indicate how often you attend
religious/spiritual services
___Never
___Only on special occasions
___A few times a year
___ Once a month
___Once a week
___ Daily

15. Please indicate your political affiliation
___ No affiliation
___Democrat
___ Republican
___Libertarian
___Green Party
___Tea Party
16. Please indicate the political philosophy that best
describes you

___No political philosophy
___Very Liberal
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Somewhat Liberal

Liberal
Conservative

Somewhat Conservative

Very Conservative
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(DOG)

APPENDIX C

DOGMATISM SCALE:

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
2
1

MlIdly
Neutral
Disagree
3
4

(DOG)

Mildly Agree
Agree
5
6

Strongly
Agree
7

X.

I may be wrong about some of the little things in life,
but I am quite certain I am right about all the BIG
issues.

Y.

Someday I will probably think that many of my present
ideas were wrong.

____ 1.

Anyone who is honestly and truly seeking the truth
will end up believing what I believe.

____ 2.

There are so many things we have not discovered
yet, nobody should be absolutely certain his
beliefs are right.
*

____ 3.

The things I believe in are so completely true, I
could never doubt them

____ 4.

I have never discovered a system of beliefs that
explains everything to my satisfaction. *

____ 5.

It is best to be open to all possibilities and
ready to reevaluate all your beliefs.
*

____ 6.

My opinions are right and will stand the test of
time.

____ 7.

Flexibility is a real virtue in thinking, since
you may well be wrong. *

____ 8.

My opinions and beliefs fit together perfectly to
make a crystal-clear "picture" of things.
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9.

There are no discoveries or facts that could
possibly make me change my mind about the things
that matter most in life.

10. I am a long way from reaching final conclusions
about the central issues in life.
*
11. The person who is absolutely certain she has the
truth will probably never find it.
*

12. I am absolutely certain that my ideas about the
fundamental issues in life are correct.
13. The people who disagree with me may well turn out
to be right.
*
14. I am so sure I am right about the important things
in life, there is no evidence that could convince
me otherwise.

15. If you are "open-minded" about the most important
things in life, you will probably reach the wrong
conclusions.
16. Twenty years from now, some of my opinions about
the important things in life will probably have
changed.*

17. "Flexibility in thinking" is another name for
being "wishy-washy" .
18. No one knows all the essential truths about the
central issues in life. *
19. Someday I will probably realize my present ideas
about the BIG issues are wrong. *
20. People who disagree with me are just plain wrong
and often evil as well.
• items requiring reverse scoring.
•
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APPENDIX D
NEED FOR COGNITION (NFC)

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
2
1

Mildly Neutral
Disagree
3
4

Mildly Agree
Agree
5
6

Strongly
Agree
7

____ 1.

I would prefer complex to simple problems.

____ 2.

I like to have the responsibility of handling a
situation that requires a lot of thinking.

____ 3.

Thinking is not my idea of fun."

____ 4.

I would rather do something that requires little
thought than something that is sure to challenge my
thinking abilities."

____ 5.

I try to anticipate and avoid situations where
there is a likely chance I will have to think in
depth about something.8

____ 6.

I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for
long hours.

____ 7.

I only think as hard as I have to."

____ 8.

I prefer to think about small, daily projects to
long-term ones.
*

____ 9.

I like tasks that require little thought once I've
learned them.
*

____ 10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to
the top appeals to me.
____ 11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with
new solutions to problems.
____ 12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very
much.*
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13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I
must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to
me.

15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual,
difficult, and important to one that is
somewhat important but does not require much
thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after
completing a task that required a lot of
mental effort.
*
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job
done; I don't care how or why it works.
*

18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even
when they do not affect me personally.
• items reverse scoring.
•
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APPENDIX E

EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS SURVEY (EBS)
Note: uses only 20 of the 36 item scale; 10 from Simple
Knowledge, EBScomp and 10 from Certain Knowledge,

EBSflex.

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
2
1
____

1.

Mildly
Neutral
Disagree
3
4

Mildly Agree
Agree
5
6

Strongly
Agree
7

I like information to be presented in a
straightforward fashion; I don't like having to
read between the lines.
*
(c)

____ 2.

Today's facts may be tomorrow's fiction,

____ 3.

If professors would stick more to the facts and do
less theorizing, one could get more out of
*
college.
(c)

4.

Wisdom is not knowing the answers, but knowing how
to find the answers, (f)

____

(f)

____ 5.

It is annoying to listen to lecturers who cannot
seem to make up their mind as to what they really
*
believe.
(c)

____ 6.

A sentence has little meaning unless you know the
situation in which it was spoken, (f)

____ 7.

I really appreciate instructors who organize their
lectures carefully and then stick to their plan.
*
(c)

____ 8.

Forming your own ideas is more important than
learning what the textbooks say. (f)

____ 9.

Even advice from experts should be questioned,
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(f)

____ 10. When I study, I look for the specific facts.
*

(c)

___ , 11. I try my best to combine information across
chapters or even across classes.(f)
____ 12. It's a waste of time to work on problems that have
no possibility of coming out with a clear-cut
answer.* (c)
____ 13. I find it refreshing to think about issues that
experts agree on.(f)
____ 14. When I learn, I prefer to make things as simple as
possible.*(c)
____ 15. A really good way to understand a textbook is to
organize the information according to your own
personal scheme, (f)
____ 16. The most important part of scientific work is original
thinking.(f)
____ 17. The best thing about science courses is that most
problems have only one right answer.
*
(c)
____ 18. It is difficult to learn from a textbook unless
you start from the beginning and master one section
at a time.*(c)
____ 19. You should evaluate the accuracy of information in
textbooks if you are familiar with the topic.(f)
____ 20. A good teacher's job is to keep students from wandering
from the right track.
(c)
*
* items reverse scoring.
(c) complexity
(f) flexibility
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APPENDIX F
INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN AND READ TO
PARTICIPANTS AT THE BEGINNING

OF THE CARD SORT TASK.
Next you will be doing a card sorting task. You have

been given 40 cards and two recording sheets. Each card has
a number, and trait or characteristic on it. Your task is

to think about yourself and your life and form the cards
into groups that you think go together, and then record the

number from the card onto the recording sheet. You can form

as many or as few groups as you think sensibly represent
yourself and your life. You can form one group at a time,

or several groups at a time before recording your groups on
to the record- sheet. If you wish, you can label your groups
on the record sheet. You are encouraged, to re-shuffle the

cards and form new groups as often as you need. to. Keep in

mind this is a free association task; allow yourself to be

thoughtful and creative as you sort through the cards and
form your groups. You have 25 minutes for this task, with a

5 minute grace to finish what ever groups you may be

working on. You are encouraged to use all the time you
need.
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APPENDIX G

SORT TASK ITEMS TO BE PRINTED

ON INDEX CARDS

1.
3.
5.
7.
9.
11.
13 .
15.
17.
19.
21.
23.
25.
27.
29.
31.
33.
35.
37.
39.

2.
4.
6.
8.
10.
12.
14.
16.
18.
20.
22.
24.
26.
28.
30.
32.
34.
36.
38.
40.

Successful
Giving
Capable
Confident
Comfortable
Independent
Needed
Communicative
Mature
Organized
Intelligent
Lovable
Fun & Entertaining
Interested
Outgoing
Energetic
Hardworking
Happy
Friendly
Optimistic
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Disagreeing
Hopeless
Lazy
Self-centered
Unloved
Not the "real me
Immature
Weary
Uncomfortable
Sad & Blue
Incompetent
Insecure
Worthless
Inferior
Irritable
Like a failure
Isolated
Indecisive
Disorganized
Tense
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